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FORMS COMMITTEE PRESENTS ADDITIONAL
STANDARD PLEADING SAMPLES FOR USE IN
FORECLOSURES THROUGH PUBLIC TRUSTEE
In the December, 1951, issue of Dicta, certain standard pleading samples to be used in proceedings under Rule 120 and foreclosures through the Public Trustee were printed. Because of
space limitations, the entire group of samples presented by the
Forms Standardization Committee could not be printed in that
issue. Additional samples to complete the set appear on the following pages.'
Forms Standardization Committee
ROYAL C. RUBRIGHT, Chairman
Sub-Committee on District Court Forms
DONALD M. LESHER, Chairman
WITHDRAWAL OF NOTICE OF ELECTION AND DEMAND
FOR SALE BY PUBLIC TRUSTEE
TO THE PUBLIC TRUSTEE IN AND FOR THE CITY AND
COUNTY OF DENVER, IN THE STATE OF COLORADO:
The undersigned hereby withdraws the notice of Election and
Demand for Sale by Public Trustee, dated the 20th day of November, 1951, wherein a sale was demanded under that certain Deed
of Trust executed by Manasseh Msqpbzd and Minnie Msqpbzd to
the Public Trustee in and for the City and County of Denver,
Colorado, which said Notice of Election and Demand for Sale was
Recorded on the 20th day of November, 1951, in the office of the
Clerk and Recorder of said City and County of Denver in Book
97457 at Page 908 of the records of said office.
Dated this 13th day of December, 1951.
Darius Dexter Grthvlm.
The above mentioned Notice of Election and Demand for Sale
by Public Trustee has this day been withdrawn.
Dated this 14th day of December, 1951.
Seth Sigismund
Public Trustee in and for City
and County of Denver, Colorado.
The samples submitted in the December, 1951, Dicta, took the proceedings
through the Public Trustee's sale and assignment of the Certificate of Purchase.
The samples submitted herewith proceed from that point. Although the Withdrawal submitted herewith predates the Certificate of Sale heretofore submitted,
it will be used only in those instances in which the obligor pays off the obligation (or in which the holder wishes, for any other reason, to prevent the sale)
after sale proceedings have been commenced.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, STATE OF COLORADO
CIVIL ACTION NO. Y 711, DIV. 7
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICA-"
TION OF DARIUS DEXTER GRTHVLM
FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE
PUBLIC TRUSTEE OF THE CITY AND
COUNTY OF DENVER, STATE OF
COLORADO, TO SELL CERTAIN REAL
ESTATE UNDER A POWER OF SALE
CONTAINED IN A DEED OF TRUST..

MOTION
TO STRIKE FROM
2
DOCKET

COMES NOW the above named petitioner by his attorney,
Silvester Hasede, and states that an Order for Sale herein was
entered by this Honorable Court on December 6, 1951; that the
3
Public Trustee has not completed the sale under this Order of Sale.
WHEREFORE, your petitioner moves that this Honorable
Court strike said cause from the docket.
Dated at Denver, Colorado, this 6th day of July, 1952.
Silvester Hasede
Attorney for Petitioner.
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICA-"
TION OF DARIUS DEXTER GRTHVLM
FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE
PUBLIC TRUSTEE OF THE CITY AND
COUNTY OF DENVER, STATE OF
COLORADO, TO SELL CERTAIN REAL
ESTATE UNDER A POWER OF SALE
CONTAINED IN A DEED OF TRUST.,

ORDER STRIKING
FROM
THE DOCKET

THIS MATTER having come on to be heard:
THE COURT DOTH ORDER:
That said cause be stricken from the docket and that no further
action be had in said cause.
Done in Open Court this 6th day of July, 1952.
BY THE COURT:
Zadok Zedekiah
Judge.
2 Because the Court has already taken final action by its order of sale, it is
felt that a motion to dismiss would not be appropriate. The sample submitted
will be used when the order of sale has been previously entered by the District
Court, but the sale by the Public Trustee will not occur by reason of withdrawal,
pay-off, etc. Some action is necessary in the District Court because Rule 120
requires that a return of the sale be made for the Court's approval.
I In the event that the Public Trustee has not commenced procedure, this
fact should be alleged.
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TRUSTEE'S CERTIFICATE OF REDEMPTION 4
STATE OF COLORADO
City and County of Denver ss.
I, SETH SIGISMUND, Public Trustee in and for the City and
County of Denver, State of Colorado, do hereby certify that Valentine Victor has this day paid to me Eight Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-two and 74/100 ($8,222.74) Dollars,5 and has this
day redeemed from the Public Trustee's sale which was held at
the hour of 10:00 o'clock A.M., on the 9th day of January, 1952,
at the Bannock Street main entrance of the City and County Building in the City and County of Denver, State of Colorado, the real
estate hereinafter described and which was sold by virtue of the
power and authority in me vested by that certain Deed of Trust
made, executed and delivered by Manasseh Msqpbzd and Minnie
Msqpbzd of the City and County of Denver, State of Colorado, to
the Public Trustee in the City and County aforesaid, dated the
18th day of April, 1948, and duly recorded in Book 97346, at page
897, of the records in the office of the Clerk and Recorder of the
said City and County of Denver to secure to DariusDexter Grthvlm
the payment of the indebtedness in said Deed of Trust described,
the said sale having been made for the sum of Seven Thousand
Nine Hundred Eighty-three and 24/100 ($7,983.24) Dollars, and
a certificate thereof duly recorded in the office of the Clerk and
Recorder of the City and County of Denver, in the State of Colorado, on the 9th day of January, 1952, in Book 97567 at page 908
of said records.
I further certify that the said Valentine Victor so redeeming
said property claimed that he redeemed the same, as
Owner and holder of the following lien, to-wit: Subsequent
Deed of Trust as appears of record in Book 97358, at page 765,
of the Records of said Clerk and Recorder's office, and that he
further claimed there was due him upon said lien Five Thousand
Three Hundred and 00/100 ($5,300.00) Dollars.
The said real estate so redeemed being described as follows,
to-wit:
4 Section 158, Chapter 40, COLO. STAT. ANN., (1935) reads as follows: "Within
six months after the date of the sale of real estate by virtue of any foreclosure of
a mortgage, trust deed or other lien, or by virtue of an execution and levy, the
owner of the premises or any person who might be liable upon a deficiency may
redeem the premises sold by paying to the public trustee, sheriff or other proper
officer the sum for which the property was sold, with interest from the date of
sale at the rate of eight per cent per annum, together with any taxes paid or other
proper charges as now provided by law and a certificate of redemption shall be
executed by the proper officer and recorded and the public trustee, sheriff, or
other officer shall forthwith pay said money to the holder of the certificate of
purchase." Persons other than the owner of the premises or persons liable upon
a deficiency shall proceed as provided in Section 159, Chapter 40, COLO. STAT.
ANN., (1935) giving notice of intention to redeem as therein provided. See Mr.
Morris' article, December, 1951, Dicta, p. 455.
1 Section 5, Chapter 88, COLO. STAT. ANN., (1935) COLO. LAWS, c. 139, Sec. 4
p. 587 (1935) provides for interest at the rate of 6% per annum. This section
supersedes Section 158, Chapter 40, quoted in footnote 4.
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Lot 1, Block 1, Lake Clozer Subdivision,
situate in the City and County of Denver, State of Colorado.
WITNESS my hand and seal this 9th day of July, 1952.0
Seth Sigismund
(Seal)
As Public Trustee in the City
and County of Denver, State
of Colorado.
STATE OF COLORADO ss.
City and County of Denver
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this
9th day of July, 1952, by Seth Sigismund, Public Trustee in said
City and County of Denver, Colorado.
Witness my hand and official seal.
My commission expires November 15, 1955.
Uriah Urban
(Notarial Seal)
Notary Public.
PUBLIC TRUSTEE'S DEED
THIS INDENTURE Made this Eleventh day of August in
the year of our Lord One Thousand nine Hundred and Fifty-two 7
between SETH SIGISMUND as the Public Trustee in the City and
County of Denver and State of Colorado, party of the first part,
and Jabez Jairus Julian, of the City and County of Denver and
State of Colorado, party of the second part:
Witnesseth, That whereas, Manasseh Msqpbzd and Minnie
Misqpbzd of the City and County of Denver, in State of Colorado,
did, by their certain trust deed, dated the 18th day of April, 1948,
which said deed was recorded in the office of the Clerk and Recorder
of the City and County of Denver, in the State of Colorado, on the
20th day of April, 1948, in book 97346 on page 897, convey to the
Public Trustee in the City and County of Denver, in the State of
Colorado, all the premises hereinafter described, to secure the
payment of their certain promissory note in said deed particularly
mentioned, and upon certain conditions in said deed particularly
declared.
And, Whereas, Default having been made in the payment of
the principal installments and other payments and notice of election and demand for sale, in writing, having been duly filed with
the Public Trustee, the said premises were duly advertised for sale
at public auction on the 9th day of January, 1952, at the Bannock
Street main entrance of the City and County Building, in the City
and County of Denver and State of Colorado, in the manner provided by said trust deed, which notice of sale was published previously in The Denver Clarion for a period of Four Weeks and a
6 Section 160, Chapter 40, CoLo. STAT. ANN., (1935) prescribes the contents
of the Certificate of Redemption. See also Section 161-168, Chapter 40, CoLo.
STAT. ANN., (1935) and Mr. Morris' article, December, 1951, Dicta, pp. 454-456.
'Under no circumstances should the issuance of the Public Trustee's deed
be delayed beyond nine months after the expiration of the last period of redemption. Sections 164, 164(1), Chapter 40, COLO. STAT. ANN., (1949 Supp.)
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printed copy of said notice of sale was duly mailed by the Public
Trustee within ten days from the date of the first publication to
the grantor in said Deed of Trust and to each and every person
who appeared to have acquired a record interest in the real estate
therein described, subsequent to the recording of said trust deed,
as provided by law.
And Said Premises Were, Upon the day and year, and at the
place mentioned aforesaid, in pursuance of said notice of sale, sold
at public auction, and at the said sale Darius Dexter Grthvlm was
the highest and best bidder, and bid for the tract hereinafter described the sum of $7,983.24 Dollars, and a certificate of purchase
was made and given therefor.
And the said Darius Dexter Grthvlm, having duly assigned
his certificate of purchase to Jabez Jairus Julian,
Now, Therefore, These Presents Witness, That the said party
of the first part, in pursuance of the power and authority in him
vested in and by the said trust deed, and by virtue of the provisions
of the statute in such cases made, and in consideration of the sum
of two dollars, to the Public Trustee in hand paid by the said
Jabez Jairus Julian, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged,
hath and doth hereby convey, remise, release and quit-claim to
the said party of the second part, his heirs and assigns forever,
all the right, title and interest, as well in law as in equity, which
the Public Trustee hath acquired by virtue of the trust deed above
mentioned, of, in, and to all the following described .tract, piece
or parcel of land, situate, lying and being in the City and County
of Denver and State of Colorado, to-wit:
Lot 1, Block 1, Lake Clozer Subdivision.
Together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments
and appurtenances thereunto belonging, or in anywise appertaining, and the reversions, remainders, rents, issues, and profits
thereof; and also all the estate, right, title, interest, claims and
demand whatsoever, as well in law as in equity, of the said party
of the first part, of, in and to the same, and any and every part
thereof, with the appurtenances which the said party of the first
part acquired by virtue of said trust deed; and all the right, title,
benefit and equity of redemption of Manasseh Msqpbzd and Minnie
Msqpbzd, their heirs and and assigns therein.
To Have and to Hold the aforesaid right, title and interest of
the said party of the first part unto the said party of the second
part, his heirs and assigns forever, as fully and absolutely as the
said party of the first part can, by virtue of the power and authority in him vested by said trust deed, convey the same.
In Witness Whereof, The said party of the first part has hereunto set his hand and seal the day and year first above written. 8
'For the most part, the preparation of the Public Trustee's deed will consist of filling in blanks. See Mr. Morris' article, December, 1951, Dicta, pp.
457-459.
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Seth Sigismund
As Public Trustee in and for the
City and County of Denver.

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this
11th day of August, 1952, by SETH SIGISMUND, as the Public
Trustee in said City and County of Denver, Colorado.
Witness my hand and official seal.
My commission expires Nov. 15, 1955.
(Notarial Seal)
Uriah Urban
Notary Public.

PLACEMENT OPPORTUNITIES
Two government agencies have recently made urgent appeals
to the Bar Association for assistance in their personnel procurement programs.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation is in need of attorneys
willing to serve the Bureau at an entrance salary of $5,500.00 per
year. While qualification demands are high, these standards have
recently been lowered. Further information may be obtained from
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 518 Railway Exchange Building, Denver.
Fifth Army Headquarters has asked us to call to the attention
of the younger members of the Bar a procurement program of the
Judge Advocate General's Corps. Qualified lawyers may receive
direct commissions in the Corps as First Lieutenants with an immediate call to active duty for a three year period. Provision has
been made for the waiver of experience requirements where it is
deemed appropriate. Additional information may be had by contacting the Chief of the Colorado Military District, Elks Building,
Denver 2, Colorado.
All lawyers are reminded of the Lawyer Placement Service
conducted by the Bar Association. Law firms or attorneys in need
of associates or employees and lawyers seeking associations or
employment are urged to communicate with the Bar Association
Secretary.

We have been asked to announce that copies of the pamphlet
"YOUR FEDERAL INCOME TAX" are now available at twentyfive cents each from the field office of the U. S. Department of
Commerce, Room 150, New Custom House, Denver.
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Seth Sigismund
As Public Trustee in and for the
City and County of Denver.

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this
11th day of August, 1952, by SETH SIGISMUND, as the Public
Trustee in said City and County of Denver, Colorado.
Witness my hand and official seal.
My commission expires Nov. 15, 1955.
(Notarial Seal)
Uriah Urban
Notary Public.
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RELIEF UPON DEFAULT UNDER A CONTRACT
FOR PURCHASE AND SALE OF LAND
BY ELLIS J. SOBOL*

This article has as its object a determination of the status of
Colorado law in regard to contracts for the purchase and sale of
real estate.
The law of property is peculiar in that upon the execution of
a contract for the purchase and sale of land the vendee acquires
an equitable interest in the land; in some jurisdictions it is necessary that the vendee enter upon the land pursuant to the contract
1
in order to acquire his equitable interest. The vendee gets such
saying that he is to
contract
the
in
an interest in spite of clauses
acquire no interest whatsoever in the land until all of the payments
making up the full purchase price have been paid. Specifically,
the question to be examined is: what facts must exist before the
court will treat the relationship of the parties as that of mortgagor
and mortgagee and declare that the interest of the vendee in the
land upon his breach cannot be forfeited except by a foreclosure
and sale; or failing that, when will equity step in and aid the vendee by giving him a chance to redeem by making payment within
a specified time? 2 It has been stated by the Colorado court, as
well as by courts of other jurisdictions, that it is of importance
in the court's determination-in cases where there is a breach by
the vendee and an attempt by the vendor to enforce a forfeiturewhether the contract contains clauses making time of the essence
and providing for a forfeiture of all improvements and payments
made by the vendee upon his failure to meet any3 payment on time
and notice by the vendor declaring a forfeiture. The inequity in
the enforcement of such provisions is at once apparent. The less
the importance of the breach by the vendee, the greater the amount
forfeited to the vendor as penalty or liquidated damages ;4 besides,
if the relationship of the parties is like that of mortgagor and
mortgagee, a time-of-essence clause should have no more effect than
a similar clause in a mortgage. 5 It is thought by the writer that
time-of-essence and forfeiture clauses are not really of great importance in Colorado, but rather, that the cases must be distinguished on other facts; that of prime importance are: the amount
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.

deFuniak, HAND3OOK OF MODERN EQUITY, pp. 242, 243
WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY, pp. 429, 430 (1930).
3American Mortgage Co. v. Logan, 90 Colo. 157, 7 P. 2d

(1st Edition, 1950).

2

953 (1932). 3 WILLIS§ 791 (Revised Edition, 1936). CORBIN, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Instalments Paid, 40 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1030.
POMIEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, § 1408 (4th ed., 1918).
4 CORBIN, Op. Cit., pp. 1014 & 1029.
WILLISTON, Op. cit., § 791.
TON ON CONTRACTS,
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of the purchase price paid in relation to the total purchase price,
the time in default, whether after default the vendee is ready and
willing to tender payment, and whether the vendee is in possession.
CONTRACT FOR PURCHASE AND SALE SIMILAR TO MORTGAGE

The early Colorado cases are not of much help because counsel
for the vendor had not yet made use of an action for possession
and forfeiture. But it is at once clear that the court recognized
that such transactions are similar to a mortgage and that the
primary object of the parties is to secure to the vendor the payment of the full purchase price. In Todd v. Simonton 6 the defendant was in possession pursuant to a contract for purchase and
sale of land under the terms of which defendant was to pay the
total price of $1,200 by September 1, 1861, the contract containing
neither time-of-essence nor forfeiture clauses. The defendant paid
nothing and in November, 1861, sold to one Stout, who went in
to possession. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant and Stout asking for a judgment for the amount of the purchase price, or in default of payment, that he be decreed to have
a lien, that the premises be sold, and the proceeds applied to the
amount due. The court stated that the relation of the parties was
analogous to that of mortgagor7 and mortgagee and that the proper
remedy was strict foreclosure.
Nevin v. Lulu and White S. M. Co.8 involved a transaction
wherein plaintiff loaned the defendants $12,000, and the defendants
conveyed by warranty deeds some mining property to trustees of
the plaintiff. The defendants stayed in possession. The trustees
and the defendants entered into an agreement whereby the trustees were to notify the defendants within ninety days whether
they wanted to retain a one-half interest in the property, which
they could do on payment of additional money, or whether they
wanted payment of $12,000. Upon the election by the trustees to
take payment and upon failure of defendants to pay the $12,000
within ninety days after notice, defendants were to forfeit all interest in the property, and time was declared to be essential. The
trustees notified defendants that they elected to take payment of
$12,000. The defendants failed to pay on time, and did not pay
anything. The trustees quitclaimed to the plaintiff who brought
action and asked that the deeds be adjudged a mortgage, that there
be a foreclosure and sale, and that plaintiff be given judgment for
Colo. 54 (1867).
'WALSH, op. cit., pp. 429-43"1. Strict foreclosure, by which the equitable estate of the purchaser is extinguished by decree unless he completes the purchase
by a date fixed by the court, is allowed in some states where the interest of the
purchaser, as measured by payments of purchase money and for improvements,
is not large. It is clear that where the equity of the purchaser is substantial,
foreclosure by sale should be required in order that the purchaser's interest may
be protected on the sale, just as a mortgagor's equity may be protected in corresponding cases of foreclosure of mortgages.
1 10 Colo. 357, 15 P. 611 (1887).
01
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any deficiency. The lower court decreed strict foreclosure, but on
appeal the court decided that Section 263 of the Code of 1883,
enacted, after the decision in Todd v. Simonton, which provides
that "a mortgage of real property shall not be deemed a conveyance whatever its terms, so as to enable the owner of the mortgage
to recover possession of the real property without foreclosure and
sale . . ." applied and that under its terms foreclosure and sale
was the only proper remedy. It is obvious from the facts that the
parties intended only a security transaction. Since defendants had
paid nothing, and since the plaintiff evidently wanted only his
money, there would have been no advantage for counsel to enforce
the forfeiture by bringing a possessory action.
ACTION UNDER. UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTE

Ruth v. Smith 9 was the first Colorado case in which counsel
made use of a possessory action against a vendee in possession
pursuant to a contract for purchase and sale of land. The action
was brought under the unlawful detainer statute of 1885,10 which
in its terms was the same as our present forcible entry and detainer statute." In that case the contract contained neither timeof-essence nor forfeiture clauses. The vendee had paid $41 out
of a total purchase price of $371.20, or about 11 per cent of the
purchase price, and the defendant in that case had been in default
about three months. The defendant did not interpose any equitable
defense or advance the argument that his interest had to be foreclosed. Instead he elected to stand on his demurrer to the complaint. The case was reversed by the supreme court because the
lower court awarded $86.66 unliquidated damages without hearing
testimony as to the extent of damage, and because the plaintiff
had been awarded greater damages than he had asked for in his
complaint. The court did not object to the possessory action and
did not state that it would be necessary to treat the transaction
as a mortgage. We may infer from this case that, even though
there are no time-of-essence or forfeiture clauses in the contract,
a vendor may recover possession and need not foreclose where the
vendee has paid only 12 per cent of the purchase price and where
he has been in default for three months. It is not clear from the
report or from the record of the case what was to happen to the
$41 paid toward the purchase price by the vendee. It is not clear
whether restitution would be granted if the amount paid by the
vendee exceeded the amount of damages sustained by the vendor.
The next case to be considered is Gordon Tiger Mining and
Reduction Company v. Brown.12 There the contract provided that
the vendee erect a mill on the mining property involved within six
months and operate it continuously; a percentage of the profit
'29 Colo. 154, 68 P. 278 (1901).
10 1 Mills Annotated Statutes, § 1973.
"COLO.

STAT. ANN., C. 70 § 4, Ninth (1935).

56 Colo. 301, 138 P. 51 (1914).
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from the ore mined and milled was to be paid to the vendor until
the vendor had received a total of $200,000, in which was to be
included an amount credited to the vendee because of its payment
of certain liens against the property. There was a clause providing for forfeiture of payments and of improvements in the event
that the vendee decided that the mines could not be worked profitably. In addition, the parties entered into an escrow agreement
providing that the deeds be deposited with a certain bank to be
delivered to the vendee on production of evidence of payment of
$200,000; on failure of the vendee to fulfill the contract by continuous operation of the mine and mill, the deeds were to be returned to
the vendor. The vendee entered into possession but failed to mine
any ore or erect the mill as agreed, but did make certain improvements. It appears that the vendor intentionally misrepresented the
title as to a one forty-eighth interest, but the vendee did nothing
about it for 16 months after learning of the fraud. When the vendee was in default about 18 months, the vendor brought action for
possession, return of the deeds, and forfeiture of payments and
improvements. The defendant had been credited with payments
consisting of expenses incurred in the payment of liens amounting
to $49,000, and defendant had spent a total of $142,000 for improvements. The defendant asked rescission on the ground of fraud
as to the one forty-eighth interest.
FORFEITURE IS UPHELD

The supreme court decided that the defendant had waived its
right of rescission because of its delay but gave the defendant
leave to file an amended answer in the district court. In its
amended answer the defendant asked damages for the fraud and
subrogation to the rights of lien claimants; it alleged it had fraudulently been induced to pay the liens. The plaintiff offered to clear
up the defect in title, and the court then gave the defendant thirty
days in which to decide whether it wished to perform the contract and pay the balance in a reasonable time. The defendant
declined to perform and the district court declared a forfeiture
and rendered a decree quieting title. The Colorado supreme court
on appeal said that in enforcing the forfeiture it was doing nothing more than enforcing the contract and that, although the defendant was entitled to dam4ges, they did not consist of the
amount the defendant would have been entitled to by virtue of a
rescission. In this case, it appears, a forfeiture was enforced
where the contract provided for forfeiture and contained a timeof-essence clause and the vendee had paid about 25 per cent of
the purchase price, and with improvements had expended a total
equal to approximately 95 per cent of the purchase price; the vendee was 18 months in default. Yet the case is not authority against
the mortgage theory or equitable relief on a similar state of facts
because the district court did offer equitable relief, which offer
was refused. From this case we may infer that, in order to be
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entitled to equitable relief or treatment as a mortgagor, the vendee
must evidence a willingness to perform the contract and must ask
for either or both.
In Roller v. Smith, 3 the next pertinent case in point of time,
we find a contract containing the usual time-of-essence and forfeiture clauses. The defendant was two months and eight days in
default and had paid about 81/ per cent of the total purchase price
of $4,000. The court paid lip service to forfeitures and said that
the defendant was entitled to no equitable relief because this was
an action to enforce and not to cancel the contract, thereby implying that the court would deny equitable relief in all such actions
no matter what the interest of the vendee. The court held for the
defendant because notice of forfeiture to the vendee was not according to the terms of the contract. The court's statements regarding denial of equitable relief are therefore dicta. But it may
be asked whether payments by the vendee of only 81/,2 per cent constitute a sufficient interest to warrant protection by a court of
equity. The court in its opinion states that the defendant asked
equitable relief, although a search of the record in the supreme
court does not reveal that the defendant had advanced any such
claim or request. The case also illustrates the fact that forfeitures
are viewed with disfavor in both law and equity, and a court will
usually demand strict compliance with the terms of a forfeiture
provision. In this case the court found that notice from the assignee of the vendor was not sufficient under the terms of the
contract.
No EQUITABLE RELIEF WHERE SMALL PERCENTAGE IS PAID

Schiffner v. Chicago Title and Trust Co.14 is a clear case where
the Colorado court enforced a forfeiture. In that case counsel for
the vendee insisted that the defendant had an interest in the land
and that the relationship of the parties was like that of mortgagor
and mortgagee. The court in its opinion said that there can be
no mortgage unless the mortgagor has real estate to pledge, and
in that case the defendant had none. The contract had the usual
provisions, forfeiture and time-of-essence clauses, although that
fact was not stressed by counsel for the vendor, nor was it mentioned by the court in its opinion. The case might be considered
by some as authority for enforcing a forfeiture clause under all
circumstances, but an examination of the facts shows its limitations. The action was brought under the unlawful detainer statute
and involved two tracts of land; the vendee had made no payments
on installments at all; as to one tract, only about 7 per cent of
the purchase price had been paid, and as to the other only 13 per
cent had been paid. The vendee was in default for a period of five
years and four months, and the vendee made no effort or statement
that he was willing to tender any of the amount due. The defendant did, however, show that as to one tract of land he had expended
"76 Colo. 371, 231 P. 656 (1924).
"79 Colo. 249, 244 P. 1012 (1926).
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considerable sums for improvements, in addition to the payment
of 7 per cent of the purchase price. All the case decides, therefore,
is that where the vendee has paid only 7 per cent to 13 per cent of
the purchase price, has been guilty of long delay, and has made
no offer to tender the amount due, he will not be entitled to treatment as a mortgagor or to relief in equity. The amount spent for
improvements can be of little importance unless such amount is
spent in pursuance of the contract, for it cannot be said that the
vendor wants the improvements even though they do pass to him
in the event of a forfeiture.
VENDOR BRINGS ACTION TO QUIET TITLE

Phares v. Don Carlos,15 Scroggs v. Harkness Heights Land
8
17
and
American Mortgage Co. v. Logan,"
Co., Pope v. Parker,
Lowe v. Sory 11 are all cases in which the vendor brought action to
quiet title. In the Phares case the vendee was not in possession.
The vendee had defaulted on certain indebtedness due the plaintiff, and the property securing the debt had been sold pursuant to
a trust deed. The parties entered into a new agreement whereby
the defendant had the option to redeem provided payment was made
before a certain date. The defendant failed to make payment on
time, and time was extended twenty days on the defendant's payment of 25 per cent of the purchase price and agreement to pay
a $100 bonus. On failure of the defendant to make further payment on time, the plaintiff brought action to quiet title. The lower
court held for the plaintiff and denied the defendant any relief.
The Colorado supreme court refused to enforce a forfeiture because the contract contained no forfeiture clause. Apparently on
the theory that time was essential, it denied that the defendant
had any interest in the land, granted the defendant restitution
and quieted title. The case does not contradict the thesis of this
paper (supra, end of second paragraph). As has been noted the
vendee was not in possession, and it does not appear that the vendee offered to tender the balance due.
In the Harkness Heights Land Co. case, again the vendee was
not in possession. 20 There the appealing defendant claimed under
one Addis who had an unrecorded contract of purchase from the
plaintiff company which held record title. Addis had paid about
26 per cent of the purchase price and was four months in default.
The contract provided that time was essential and for forfeiture.
The defendant relied solely on the theory of estoppel, in that the
16

1871 Colo. 508, 208 P. 458 (1922).

"76 Colo. 597, 233 P. 831 (1925).
"84 Colo. 535, 271 P. 1118 (1928).
1890 Colo. 157, 7 P. 2d 953 (1932).
"101 Colo. 341, 111 P. 2d 1054 (1941).
-"WALSH, OP. cit., p. 376. It seems clear that the notion that possession gives
the purchaser an equitable interest which he would not have otherwise is not
based on any valid reason . . . Possession, particularly when the purchaser has
changed his position by making improvements will make his equitable claim to
relief from forfeiture much more certain, but such facts are by no means essential.
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plaintiff had held Addis out as owner and was now estopped from
denying title in Addis. The court found that the evidence showed
that the defendant's agent who conducted the transaction for the
defendant had notice of the plaintiff's title and that Addis held
by contract. The court quieted the plaintiff's title. The defendant
did not ask for restitution and it is an interesting question whether
restitution to the defendant as assignee of Addis' interest would
have been granted. In view of the Phares case, it is believed that
restitution would have been granted had it been sought. It is difficult to see why the addition of a forfeiture clause in the Harkness
Heights Land Co. case should make any difference if it were found
that the amount retained was not liquidated damages but was a
penalty. Since the total amount paid, although amounting to
about 26 per cent of the purchase price, was only $140, it may be
that the court would have considered it as liquidated damages had
a claim for restitution been advanced.

A POSSIBLE RULE
Pope v. Parker 21 is a case which further helps us in trying
to develop a workable rule. The assignee of the vendee was in
possession pursuant to contract, and the assignor defaulted. There
was a new agreement, and the assignor again defaulted. The assignor then gave the plaintiff vendor a quitclaim deed, and the
plaintiff brought action. Thirty-one per cent of the purchase price
had been paid, and the time in default under the second contract
was about three months. The first contract had neither time-ofessence nor forfeiture clauses, but the second contract did provide that time was essential. The court said that both contracts
were mortgages which secured to the plaintiff the performance
of the vendee's obligation, and that the fact that the plaintiff retained title to the property as security had the same effect as if
the defendant's assignor had conveyed it to him, thereby deciding,
by implication, that it made no difference in the court's decision
whether the contract declared time to be essential or not. The
court held that under Section 281 of the Code (1921), since the
contract was in effect a mortgage, the only proper remedy was
foreclosure.
Why must the contract in this case be treated as a mortgage
while those in Roller v. Smith and in Schiffner v. Chicago Title
and Trust Co., supra, were not so treated? These cases were decided within four years. In the Pope case the vendee's payments
were in a greater amount. In the Smith case only 81/ per cent of
the purchase price had been paid, and in the Schiffner case, from
7 per cent to 13 per cent had been paid as compared with about
30 per cent here. Further, in the Schiffner case the vendee had
been in default-over five years and made no attempt to tender the
amount due.
. In the American Mortgage Co. v. Logan case, 22 the vendor
brought action to quiet title; the contract had time-of-essence and
21 Supra,
2

note 17.
Supra, note 18.
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forfeiture clauses. The court held that the contract was not a
mortgage and that the defendant was entitled to no relief against
a forfeiture. But there the vendee was not in possession. There
were two extensions of time by subsequent agreements, and although the defendant was credited with payment of $8,000, or 30
per cent of the purchase price, that payment had been made
in
stock of the vendee company which was largely worthless. 23
In Lowe v. Sory'2 4 the vendor brought action to quiet title.
The total purchase price was $30,000, and in addition the defendant agreed to pay the sums of $4,544.17 and $1,650 to other persons
interested in the property. The defendants pleaded that the plaintiff had wrongfully obtained possession of the property, and defendants asked that they be given possession, that they be decreed
to have equitable title and be given damages. Plaintiff's general
demurrer was sustained and defendants refused to amend. The
supreme court affirmed the lower court's ruling quieting title in the
vendor. Defendants had paid $13,500 out of the total purchase of
$30,000 or about 45 per cent. The defendants' interest in this case
was greater than that in Pope v. Parkerwhere the court had refused
to enforce a forfeiture. However, here the defendant was not in possession, and made no attempt to offer to pay the amount due. The
court said that the possession of the plaintiff was lawful "considering that the defendants were in default, not attempted to be gainsaid, and that as the result thereof plaintiff enjoyed contractual right
to 're-enter upon the premises and take possession.'" The court
noted that the defendant had not alleged that they came within
the rule cited in the American Mortgage Co.. case 25 and that defendants did not allege their inability to perform, or that plaintiff
caused defendants' default or contributed thereto. The court said
that defendants' attitude toward their obligation to pay, by their
pleading, seemed to be that they did not intend or even wish to
pay. Thus in addition to the fact that the defendants had been
given extensions, it appears that they were not in possession and
made no attempt or offer to tender the amount due.
RELIEF WHERE LARGE PERCENTAGE OF PRICE IS PAID

The case of Fairview Corp. v. American Mines and Smelting

Co. 26 involved a lease and option to purchase some mining property.

The price was to be paid in yearly installments, and certain royalties from the working of the mine were to be applied to the purchase price. The defendant defaulted in payment of the installments, and there were several new agreements whereby time was
extended. On the day of the last installment the vendor sent notice
21Frazer Arnold, The Mortgage in Essence: A Stride Forward in Equity, 19
Rocky Mt. L. R. 123 (1947).
1 Supra, note 19.
'The general rule is that a vendee is not entitled to relief against a forfeiture where he makes no attempt to fulfill his part of the contract, and where
his default was not caused by fraud, ignorance not wilful, surprise, accident,
or mistake.
2686 Colo. 77, 278 P. 800 (1926).
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of a forfeiture. The vendee had paid about 57 per cent of the purchase price and was less that one month in default after his failure to pay during the period provided for in the contract for payment after notice. There were neither time-of-essence nor forfeiture clauses in the contract. The court said that the lease and
option agreement merged into a contract of purchase and sale by
the extension agreements and stressed that a large part of the
purchase price had been paid. It pointed to the absence in the
contract of forfeiture and time-of-essence clauses. 27 The court held
that the relationship of the parties was similar to that of mortgagor and mortgagee, saying that the plaintiff kept title for security only and that his proper action was in foreclosure.
FORFEITURE CLAUSE NOT CONTROLLING

On the basis of cases thus far considered it might be said that
the provision in the contract for a forfeiture is of importance because in the cases of Pope v. Parker and Fairview Mining Corp. v.
American Mines and Smelting Co., both supra, there were no provisions for forfeiture. But the more recent cases now to be considered reject any such thesis. In Rocky Mountain Gold Mines,
Inc. v. Gold, Silver, and Tungsten, Inc.,2s there was a lease which
provided for fulfillment of various conditions as to the working
of the mine, including getting a certain mill in working condition
by a certain date. On failure to do so the lessor was to pay lessee
a certain sum each 30 days thereafter until the mill was in the
stipulated condition. The lessor was to receive certain royalties
from the mining operation, and if the royalties did not equal certain fixed sums at certain stated dates the lessee was to make up
the difference. Time was declared essential, and on failure of the
lessee to perform any covenant, the lessor might terminate the
lease. The lessee agreed to surrender the property on expiration
or termination of the lease. There was also an option to purchase,
after full payment. Performance of the lease terms was essential
to the right to exercise the option. The total purchase price was
$85,000. The lessee had paid $53,148.62 or about 62 per cent of
the purchase price, and had made improvements and spent money
getting operations started in an amount which far exceeded the
purchase price. The defendant failed to pay one-half of a monthly
payment and plaintiff sent notice of termination and brought action of ejectment. The defendant asked relief in equity. The
supreme court said that it appeared that the main purpose of the
lease and option agreement was the sale of the property and payment of the purchase price and that when the vendee has substantially performed, the contract operates as security as to the balance to be paid, and equitable relief is available. The court noted
that there was no long delay, that the time-of-essence clause was
not controlling, and that there was no need for the defendant to
tender the amount due because that rule does not apply in an
21 Time is always of the
essence in an option agreement, but as has been
stated the original agreement had merged into one of purchase and sale.
28104 Colo. 478, 93 P. 2d 973 (1939).
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only the construction of a contract and
action which has as its object
29
relation of the parties.
In Cavos v. Geihsler 30 the court again recognized that there
was a point at which the vendee by his payments would obtain a
sufficient interest in the property to be protected as a mortgagor
or by relief in equity. The vendees had agreed to assume an existing encumbrance on the property and taxes, and in addition, to
make monthly payments with interest. The defendants had reduced the encumbrance, but according to the findings of fact of
the lower court they still owed slightly more than the original
amount of the amount payable in monthly installments. The contract provided that time was of the essence, and for forfeiture.
In all, the defendants paid close to 18 per cent of the total purchase price and were in default 31 days on a new contract executed by the parties. The supreme court ordered the trial court
to enter a decree of strict foreclosure, granting defendants six
months to pay the amount due.
CASE IS OF LIMITED APPLICATION

It does not seem that the case determines the lowest level at
which a vendee has by payment obtained a sufficient interest in
the property to warrant protection by equity. The finding of fact
was that the defendants still owed over $1,500 in installments and
$2,200 on the encumbrance out of a total purchase price of $4,500,
and the Supreme Court of Colorado recited the finding of facts of
the lower court. But the supreme court had written an opinion
declaring a forfeiture, reversing a decree of foreclosure in the
lower court. On rehearing, an amicus curiae brief was filed which
pointed to the fact that the plaintiff, although frequently requested
to do so, could not show how much had been paid by the defendants. The brief further pointed to convincing evidence in the
record that the defendants had made payments on an average of
$45 per month during the total time in occupancy, for about five
years. From the evidence in the record it is hard to see how the
lower court reached its conclusion that the defendant still owed
more than the original total amount to be paid in installments. It
is possible that the court reversed itself because it believed that
the defendants had paid more than 18 per cent of the purchase
price.
Wiley v. Lininger 31 was a case where the contract had no timeof-essence nor forfeiture clauses. Counsel brought action asking
foreclosure. The lower court gave the plaintiff judgment for the
back installment and interest and gave the defendant six months
to pay the amount due into the registry of the court; if the defendant failed to do so, the plaintiff was to be at liberty to petition
the court for such further order as might be proper. The Supreme
Court of Colorado found that the contention of the defendant that
It is not apparent how an action in ejectment can be termed one for a
declaratory judgment.
so109 Colo. 163, 123 P. 2d 822 (1942).
119 Colo. 497, 204 P. 2d 1083 (1949)
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the decree of the lower court worked a forfeiture was untenable,
and that the lower court was in error in entering judgment for
the amount due, since the plaintiff had requested foreclosure. The
court did not direct the trial court what decree to enter, but stated
that the lower court should take into consideration the fact that
the defendant had made substantial payments and that the contract did not provide for a forfeiture.
COURT AGAIN DENIES MORTGAGE THEORY

In the last case to be considered, Miller v. Temple,3 2 we again
find the court denying that the typical contract for purchase and
sale of land could be a mortgage. The contract provided that time
was of the essence and for forfeiture, and the vendee was to be
guilty of unlawful detainer if he held possession after notice of
forfeiture. The court said that it would defeat the clear provision
in the contract for action in unlawful detainer if the contract be
held a mortgage, but such statement was made because of the unusual facts in the case. The assignee of the vendee had sold to
the plaintiff when the last payment under the contract was four
days overdue and promised conveyance of title upon payment of
the balance of $2,500 in two years, which was the amount owed
to the vendor. The vendor went to see the plaintiff who had gone
into possession and told him that $2,500 was still due on the contract, but no definite arrangements were made between the plaintiff and vendor about payment. About five months later the vendor
served notice of forfeiture, whereupon the plaintiff brought action
for specific performance alleging an oral agreement on the part
of the vendor to accept plaintiff's promissory note for the balance
due. The defendant filed a cross-complaint in unlawful detainer.
The finding of fact was against the plaintiff regarding the oral
agreement alleged. We find that in this case the vendor had received payments amounting to about 30 per cent of the purchase
price and that the default had existed for a year and eight months.
The plaintiff, vendee, claimed at the trial that he did not know
whom to pay and that he was willing to pay the balance of the
purchase price. The vendor stated on cross-examination that he
was willing to accept payment of the balance of the purchase price.
The court granted the vendee thirty days to pay the balance due
and cited the rule of the American Mortgage Co. case. 33 While the
rule seems to fit the facts of this case, it does not fit the facts of
any of the other cases in which the court has refused to enforce a
forfeiture. Why then, if this is the true rule, has not a forfeiture
been enforced in those cases? It may be that the court was willing
to allow the buyer in the Miller case equitable relief even after he
had been in default for a longer period of time than is usual in
the cases, because of his ignorance; or it may be that the case
limits the time in default which will be allowed to one year and
eight months; default in the other cases where the court refused
120 Colo. 546, 211 P. 2d 989 (1949).
Supra, note 25.
S

DICTA

Jan., 1952

to enforce a forfeiture did not exceed six weeks, e.g., Rocky Mountain Gold Mines case ;34 default in the Cavos case 35 was only 31
days, but there had ben several new agreements extending time.
More important, probably, is that the buyer was in possession,
that about 30 per cent of the purchase price had been paid, that
the vendee claimed that he was entitled to treatment as mortgagor,
and that the vendee was ready and willing to tender the balance due.
CONCLUSION

An examination of the cases has shown that the court has
stated different rules in its decisions. But the cases can perhaps
be distinguished and thus reconciled. The elements of reconciliation and distinction are: payment of a substantial part of the
purchase price, possession by the vendee, length of time in default,
and whether the vendee is willing to pay the amount due. If the
cases are examined under this viewpoint, as has been done,
it will be seen that when all elements have been present the buyer
has been treated as mortgagor or granted equitable relief.
In the cases of Scroggs v. Harkness Heights Land Co.; Phares
v. Don Carlos; American Mortgage Co. v. Logan; and Lowe v. Sory
the vendee was not in possession. Foreclosure and sale or strict
foreclosure were not deemed proper, and a forfeiture was enforced
in all those cases except that of Phares v. Don Carlos where restitution was granted the vendee. In the Lowe case the vendee had
made payments amounting to about 45 per cent of the purchase
price, a greater amount than in other cases where the court refused to enforce a forfeiture, but in addition to not being in possession, the vendee did not attempt to pay the balance due.
In the cases of Fairview Mining Corp. v. American Mines and
Smelting Co.; Pope v. Parker;Rocky Mountain Gold Mines v. Gold,
Silver, and Tungsten; Cavos v. Geihsler; and Miller v. Temple the
vendee was treated as mortgagor or given a chance to redeem
within a time set by the court. In the Cavos case only about 18 per
cent of the purchase price had been paid, but for reasons stated
it is not believed that the Cavos case can be considered representative as to the percentage of the purchase price which will constitute a sufficient payment by the vendee. About 30 per cent of the
purchase price had been paid in Pope v. Parker and Miller v. Temple and over one-half in the Fairview and Rocky Mountain cases.
Thus it may be inferred that payment of about 30 per cent of the
purchase price by the vendee may constitute a sufficient interest
if the other elements are present.
A willingness to pay the amount due and the length of time
in default have only been mentioned by the court in cases where
the payments by the vendee have been small, or when he was not
in possession. Therefore, it is not known whether either factor
would be of controlling importance in the event that the vendee
had made substantial payments and was in possession.
Supra, note 28.
Supra, note 30.
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INCOME TAXES DURING ESTATE
ADMIN ISTRATION
BY JAMES B. DAY
of the Denver Bar

One of the many problems which face a fiduciary administering a decedent's estate is the necessity of preparing and filing
Federal and Colorado income tax returns. This article will discuss
various aspects of the problem in the hope that it will help attorney in recognizing and dealing with income tax problems. The
scope of the article is so broad that no exhaustive discussion of
any particular aspect will be undertaken, but every effort will
be made to hit the high spots,
It seems to the writer that a fiduciary has three primary concerns with respect to income tax, and this article will accordingly
deal separately with each of them in turn: the decedent's final
return, the returns of the estate, and problems of personal liability of the executor.
THE DECEDENT'S FINAL RETURN

For the sake of brevity we shall consider decedents who were
on a calendar year basis at the time of death and who used a cash
basis of accounting for income tax purposes. Most decedents will
fall into this class.
The decedent's final return will cover the period from the
end of his last taxable year up to and including the date of death.
This fractional year return is considered a fiscal year return, even
though decedent had been on a calendar year.' The fiduciary must
prepare a Federal and Colorado decedent's final return if the gross
income of the decedent exceeds $600.00 for the period covered by
the return. The return is due on or before the 15th day of the
third month (fourth month for Colorado) following the close of
the twelve month period which began with the first day of a
decedent's fractional year.
A fiduciary may find that he must prepare not only a decedent's final return, but also a return for the decedent's last full
calendar year, in the event the decedent had not done so himself
before his death. This is not uncommon where a decedent dies
between January 1 and March 15 of any year. The Federal law
permits a joint return to be filed by a decedent and a surviving
spouse in the year of death, and the period of the return is considered to be the period of the surviving spouse's taxable year.
In Colorado, separate returns must be filed in the year of death.
A fiduciary may have to file a decedent's final Federal return
in order to obtain a refund to which the estate may be entitled,
as where more has been withheld from wages and more has been
' Therefore where the rates of tax are changed by Statute to become effective
in the middle of a calendar year, one may not use the calendar year rates, but
one must pro-rate taxes over the respective time before the change in rates and
after the change.
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paid on estimated tax than the return shows the decedent owes.
In such a case, certified copies of letters testamentary or of administration should be attached to the final return; otherwise the
refund will be delayed. Always be alert to discover the right to
refunds.
Liability for payment of estimated taxes ceases with death
as to future installments, so bills from the Collector's Office, based
on estimated forms filed by decedent, may be ignored.
INCOME TO BE INCLUDED

Present Federal law in this respect was radically changed by
the Revenue Act of 1942 which adopted Section 126 of the Internal
Revenue Code concerning "income and deductions in respect of
a decedent." Colorado has not adopted any part of the changes,
so we find some fairly important differences in the treatment of
income and deductions. The former Federal and present Colorado
law is that items of accrued income must be shown on decedent's
final return although not received by decedent in the taxable period
covered by the return and even though decedent was on the cash
basis. Present Federal law requires that accrued items shall be
reported when received by those entitled to receive them (generally
the estate).
1. Salaries: On Federal, show only checks or cash actually
received by decedent while he was alive. On Colorado, be sure to
pick up not only checks and cash actually received, but also any
additional payments to which decedent was entitled, such as salary
from last pay day to death, and any bonuses to which he might
be entitled.
2. Interest: On a decedent's final Federal return you show
only interest actually or constructively received by the decedent
while he was alive. All bond coupons which matured during the
period of the return would be shown. Colorado requires a more
troublesome procedure, namely that interest be accrued on a
day to day basis, so that if you have bond coupons you have to
figure interest from the date the last coupon was paid to the date
of death, and show on decedent's final return both the amount of
the cashed or cashable coupons and the amount of such accruals.
Naturally in Colorado you only show the difference between the
value of the later maturing coupons and the amount you have
accrued on the decedent's final return when you report the bond
income on the estate's first income tax return. On the Federal
Estate income tax return you would show the full amount of the
later maturing coupon. U. S. Government savings bonds which are
held by decedent with another as co-owner, or payable on death
to another person can be ignored by the fiduciary, for it is the
duty of the survivor
to report the increase in value when the
2
bonds are cashed.

'Except

when decedent had been reporting the increment on the bond each
year. In such case the survivor only reports the difference between the value
at death and at time of cashing.
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4. Dividends: On Federal return show only dividends received
or constructively received by decedent. On Colorado pick up not
only dividends received, but also dividends which were payable
to stockholders of record on a date prior to or on the day of death.
5. PartnershipIncome: An article could be written on this
subject alone, and it is a complicated one. Assuming the partnership ends with the death of the partner, which is generally the
case, the income of the partnership for the partnership year or
years ending with the dissolution, as properly computed in accordance with partnership method of accounting, is included to the
extent of the deceased partner's share on his final return. There
would seem to be no distinction between the Federal and Colorado
rules in this situation. There is a possibility that Colorado might
require a decedent's share of items of accrued partnership income
to be shown on decedent's final return, even though under the partnership's method of accounting such items were not accruable
at death.
6. Installment Contracts: Under Federal and State law it ik
possible to report capital gain over a period of years if certain
conditions are met with respect to payments. It should be noted
that the law requires a fiduciary either to pick up all the unreported
capital gain on the decedent's final return, or to post a bond with
a designated official conditioned on the reporting of the income
element of the installments received by the persons entitled to
receive them.
DEDUCTIONS OF A DECEDENT

The usual deductions that are allowed on a personal income
tax return are allowed to a decedent; however, under Federal law
only items actually paid out during decedent's lifetime can be deducted, while under Colorado law not only can such items be deducted, but you may also deduct any accrued item, such as interest
and taxes. In fact in Colorado such items as have accrued as
deductions must be taken on decedent's final return, or they are
lost to the decedent and to the estate. A good example of such a
deduction would be a real estate tax where a Colorado decedent
dies after March 1, the date when such taxes become a lien. This
tax will probably be paid a year or so later by the person entitled
to the real estate, but it is a deduction on decedent's final state
(but not Federal) return.
THE ESTATE INCOME TAX RETURN

The estate is considered a separate and distinct taxable entity
from the decedent. The period of the first estate return begins one
day after death, and a fiduciary may choose his own taxable year,
provided that it does not cover a period more than twelve months
in time, and provided that it ends on the last day of a month.
Once having picked his taxable year, a fiduciary must stick to it
thereafter and file twelve month returns, unless he gets permission
from the Commissioner to change his taxable year. A return must
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be filed if the estate's income for the taxable year exceeds $600.00
for both Federal and Colorado income tax purposes. Returns are
filed on Federal form 1041 and Colorado form 104:1.
INCOME TO BE SHOWN ON ESTATE INCOME TAX RETURN

1. General: The easiest way to state the law on this point is
to say that one picks up on the estate's first income tax return all
items of taxable income received by the estate except those which,
under the rules previously stated in this article, should be shown
on the decedent's final return.
2. Basis and Date of Acquisition on Sale of Capital Assets:
Under Colorado law you have one simple rule. The cost or basis
is the fair market value on the date of death (usually as evidenced
by an inheritance tax return), and the date of acquisition is the
date of death. Under Federal law the rule is less simple. The
date of acquisition is always date of death, but the cost or basis
may be either the fair market value at the date of death, or the
fair market value on one year after the date of death. Where
there is no estate tax return filed, or where the optional valuation
date is not used where an estate return is filed, then you use the
value on date of death; but when you have an estate tax return
and have used the optional valuation date, then you use the value
on one year after death. In a situation where the optional valuation date was used for estate tax purposes, but an asset is disposed
of within a year of death, then there can be no income tax gain
or loss because the estate tax law adopts the sale price as the
value to be used with respect to the asset disposed of on the estate
tax return. It should be noted that where an estate asset is distributed in kind to satisfy a specific bequest of cash, the law considers this to be the equivalent of a sale by the fiduciary, and gain
or loss must be recognized, measured by the difference between
the cost basis and the value of the assets distributed in kind; this
does not apply to distributions in kind to residuary legatees.
DEDUCTIONS OF THE ESTATE INCOME TAX RETURN

1. Administration expenses, including administrator's or executor's fees and attorney's fees, may be deducted on the estate
income tax return for the year in which paid, provided that they
are not taken as a deduction on an estate tax return, and further
provided that there is attached in duplicate to the estate income
tax return on which the deductions are claimed a statement to
the effect that the items have not been claimed as deductions foi
estate tax purposes and waiving the right to have the items claimed
as estate tax deductions. A recent ruling 3 states that some administration expenses may be taken on income tax returns and others
on estate tax returns, provided the same deduction is not taken
twice, and provided the requirements concerning the statement
and waiver-are met. In small estates it is often possible to spread
out the payment of administration expenses so as to reduce the
estate net income below the $600.00 point for all the taxable years,
aI.T. 4048, 1951-9-13579.
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and this should be borne in mind when advising fiduciaries. Colorado regluations
flatly disallow a deduction for administration
4
expenses.
2. Taxes, Interest, etc. These items may be taken when paid,
provided that they were not taken on decedent's final return under
the rules stated earlier in this article. If such items were accrued
debts at decedent's death, they may also be taken on the estate and
inheritance tax returns, and you will in effect be getting a double
deduction with respect to them.
3. Deductions of Estate Tax: If an item has to be included
as income on an estate income tax return, which also had to be
included as an asset for estate tax purposes, then you are allowed
a deduction on the estate income tax return of the amount of
estate tax attributable to the inclusion of that particular item on
the estate tax return. The computation of the deduction is fairly
complicated, but the regulations contain examples. There are no
Colorado income tax regulations on this subject.
4. Payments to Beneficiaries: Amounts of income properly
paid to beneficiaries may be deducted from the estate's income
tax return. Federal authorities take the position that no court
order is necessary to support such deductions, on the theory that
if such payments are made it will be presumed that they are properly made in view of the fact that administrators and executors
are court officials and are subject to the control of the court. The
position of the Colorado authorities is less clear in this respect,
and it is the author's understanding that it is best to obtain a court
order directing the income payment if the fiduciary wishes to
have such payments considered as income tax deductions. Of
course in any situation where the estate deducts amounts as payments to beneficiaries, then such payments must be reported as
income by the beneficiaries.
THE FEDERAL

65 DAY RULE

This rule is one of the hardest to understand and to apply in
all Federal income tax practice. In general, the rule may be said
to be that if a distribution of income of an estate for a particular
year is properly distributed to a beneficiary within 65 days after
the end of that particular year, then such distribution is a deduction on the estate income tax return for that particular year and
must be included on the personal return of the beneficiary for
his taxable year in which the estate's taxable year terminates. For
example, assume an estate and beneficiary both on calendar years,
and a distribution of income on February 1 of the year following
of $1,000.00. Then the estate will deduct this $1,000.00 from its
return for the period ended December 31, previously, and the
beneficiary will report the $1,000.00 on his personal return for
the year ending the previous December 31. The thing to remember
about this rule is that if you close an estate within 65 days after
the end of the estate's taxable year, you will be required to deduct
4

Art. 6(a) (2).
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distributions to beneficiaries that ordinarily will have not been
deductible, but would have been taxable to the estate. Other provisions of Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code should be
carefully studied in connection with the Federal Estate income
tax years where you make partial or final distributions to beneficiaries.
The Colorado income tax law presents no such problems. The
estate is regarded as a separate entity up to the moment of closing,
and you compute your tax regardless of what is going to happen
to the income after the estate is closed, without taking any deductions for distributions of income to beneficiaries unless there has
been a court order for the distribution of income prior to the order
of final distribution.
It is interesting to note that there is considerable sentiment
in favor of modifying the Federal 65 day rule, and bills have been
introduced in Congress to accomplish this purpose.
PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL LIABILITY

An executor may be personally liable under both Federal and
Colorado income tax law for debts owed to the taxing authorities
by either the decedent or the estate. Under Federal Law 5 he is
liable to the extent of payments which he may make of any debts
due by the decedent or estate, while under Colorado law there is
apparently no limit to the extent of liability. This liability will
extend to debts incurred for taxes owing by the decedent during
his lifetime as well as those incurred during administration.
A. Federal Law
Two steps should be taken to minimize the risk involved by
these provisions of the law.
1. Give notice of fiduciary relationship under Section 312 of
the Internal Revenue Code. After you have done this, the Commissioner must direct all notices of deficiency to the fiduciary and
there is no chance that deficiencies will be assessed against the
decedent without the fiduciary's knowledge.
2. Reduce the period of limitation against assessments of deficiency by applying for prompt assessments of tax on returns
filed by decedent and by the estate under Section 275 (b) of the
Internal Revenue Code. Such requests must be made after the
returns are filed and the code provides that the Commissioner has
only eighteen months from the date of the request in which to
assess a deficiency. Of course, if the regular three year statute of
limitations will run out prior to the eighteen month period, there
is no need to request prompt assessment for any taxable year on
which the three years statute will have operated by the end of
18 months.
When there is serious doubt in the fiduciary's mind as to the
correctness of returns which have not been protected by limitations, he would do well to hold out a reserve from his final distribution.
' Section 3467 Revised Statutes of the United States.

Jan., 1952

DICTA

B. Colorado Law
Chapter 84 A, Section 44, of the Colorado income tax law
provides that a fiduciary may apply to the Director of Revenue
for a so-called closing agreement to settle all questions of tax
liability of the decedent or the estate. The Director must take
action within six months of the application, or the fiduciary
will be discharged from personal liability. The better practice is
to apply for a closing agreement at the time of filing the decedent's
final income tax return to cover returns filed by the decedent in
his lifetime and to apply for closing agreements on the estate's
income tax return at time of filing the final estate income tax
return. Under present regulation 6 the right to ask for two closing
agreements might be questioned, but such a request would appear
to be justified under the law, and is desirable from the point of
view of closing estates more rapidly. The fiduciary's primary concern is with the decedent's lifetime returns, not with the returns
which he has himself prepared. If he has had clearance on returns
filed by the decedent by the expiration of six months from the
date of his request for a closing agreement, he will for all practical purposes be ready to close the estate without fear of hidden
tax traps.

SHOULD A LAWYER'S OFFICE
BE A DEAD STORAGE WAREHOUSE?
JACOB V. SCHAETZEL

of the Denver Bar

Office space costs as much as $2.25 or more per square foot
in large cities, and with expanding business every foot of space
in a lawyer's office counts. Should we not give our clients their
files when we are through with their cases?
Our office now has a record of 9,250 cases handled under this
system during the past 12 years, and we have never regretted our
move to return all files to the clients when their cases are completed. Here is how it works:
We have a large 5"x8" white card with a record of the case
on it. It contains such data as Court number (if there is one),
name of client and who referred the client to us, work to be done,
estimated fee, estimated time required, and then the final fee that
was actually charged and collected, and the total number of hours
consumed. A review of these cards from time to time will tell us
how much per hour we were able to charge our clients and thus
assist us in determining future fees to be charged in like cases.
This card has sufficient space to record things we are doing for
the client. When our work is completed, we make a note on the
card as to the disposition made of the case and then deliver the
entire file to the client after taking his receipt. We itemize the
important documents such as deeds, releases, abstracts, etc., and
6 Article 37.
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then generally add a statement, "together with complete contents
of file." This file includes all correspondence connected with the
case. Any papers that we think we should keep, such as closing
sheets on real estate transactions, receipts for abstracts, etc., are
fastened permanently to this white card. All cards bear a file
number and the cards are then placed in our permanent file. Any
information on possible will contests is retained by us. Under
this system if a client calls us and wants to know where his papers
or abstracts of title are, we can immediately turn to our index
and then look at the white card and tell him what disposition was
made of these papers.
We believe it to be much better for a client to have his own
papers than to leave them in his lawyer's office. Lawyers die,
retire, move or go into military or government service, and it
then becomes a serious problem as to what to do with their old files.
Many lawyers who go into government service leave their
papers in their attics, basements, or in the attics of some of our
office buildings, and when somebody wants their papers, it is difficult to find them. In fact, some of them never are found.
A lawyer is not paid for storing old files and the only reasons
I ever heard as to why he should do it was the fact that it brought
the business back to the office. If the work we do for our clients
won't bring them back, they won't come back anyway and it is
rather embarrassing to have an attorney come in with a letter
from the former client asking for the delivery of the papers to
him. Another reason I have heard is that the lawyer might be
liable for some of his acts unless it could be explained by some of
the letters in the file. Under modern practice, we can compel the
client to produce these letters should occasion arise because they
have receipted for the entire file and should the papers not show
up upon proper showing to the Court, we could give oral testimony
as to their contents. In our 12 years of returning the files to the
clients, we have had no occasion to regret our procedure. When
our files are all active, papers properly filed and indexed, it only
takes a few moments' time to report the status of a case to our
client. We don't have to take time out to look through old files to
satisfy the curiosity of clients as to whether a certain thing was
or was not said years before. I have never known a client to
tender a fee for the many hours spent in searching files. We tell
the clients to file certain papers in the bottom of their trunks,
others are to go in their safety boxes, and still others we leave
discretionary with them as to whether they will or will not
be destroyed. Another nice result that happens is that the clients
will look through the file and for the first time realize the large
amount of work and correspondence which their case necessitated,
and some are frank enough to admit that the fee charged was
more than reasonable. Yes, we find that it does not pay to be A
dead storage warehouse for our clients' old files.
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LIABILITY OF COUNTIES FOR SUPPORT OF
INMATES IN STATE INSTITUTIONS*
FRANK A. WACHOB
Assistant Attorncy General, 8tate of Colorado

This subject could be briefly covered by reading two or three
excerpts from the 1935 statutes as amended, but such procedure
would be neither helpful nor instructive. We are here confronted
with more than a bald statement of law. The actual situation is
an intricate and perplexing problem of law and fact. One which
the legislature has done little, over the years, to simplify; one
which state officials have simply ignored for twenty-five years or
more.
In order to bring the matter into proper perspective, let us
analyze the problem which confronts us. The legislature has defined an insane person as follows:'
The term "insane person," as used in this article,
shall be construed to include idiots, and any person so
insane and distracted in his mind as to endanger his own
person or property, or the person and property of another, or others, if allowed to go at large. The phrases
"incompetent," "mental incompetent," "incapable" and
"feeble-minded" as used in this article, shall be construed
to mean any person who, though not insane, is by reason
of old age, disease, weakness of mind, feebleness of mind,
or from any other cause, incapable, unassisted, to properly manage and take care of himself or his property, and
by reason thereof, would be likely to be deceived or imposed upon by artful or designing persons.
This general and all-inclusive class of insane persons has
been further broken up by the legislature into three main categories, according to the places where they are to be confined.
THE COLORADO STATE HOSPITAL

Let us first consider those confined at the Colorado State Hospital. This institution was established by the second session of the
General Assembly in 1879 which provided that "There is hereby
established the Colorado insane asylum, for the treatment and
care of such persons as may become insane from uny cause." 2
After the decision rendered by our Supreme Court in the case
of State Bd. v. Denver,3 there was initiated and passed Chapter 79
of the 1917 Session Laws 4 whereby,
All persons who have been or may hereafter be adjudged to be insane, are hereby made wards of the state
* An address presented at the meeting of the County Jdges Association
during the bar convention at Colorado Springs on October 25, 1951.
'COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 105, § 1 (1935).
2 Id. at § 37.
161 Colo. 266 (1916).
'COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 105, §§ 42 and 43 (1935).
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of Colorado; and it is hereby made the duty of the Colorado board of corrections [now under the Administrative
Code, the Division of Public Welfare] to admit into the
Colorado insane asylum, or to provide and care for elsewhere all insane persons who may be committed to the
Colorado insane asylum.
Chapter 118 of Session Laws of 1915 was amended by Chapter 131 of the 1925 Session Laws wherein the estates of the inmates were liable for their support and maintenance while at the
Colorado State Hospital, but the counties were absolved from
such support and maintenance by paragraph 3 of the same act.
Since the whole matter of county liability for inmate costs at the
Ridge and Grand Junction schools resolves itself around this provision, we shall here quote the statute and refer to it under our
later discussion :5
If the commission reports that the person complained
of has real or personal estate, and the report in other respects requires the patient to be committed to the care
of some person or institution as before set forth, it shall
be the duty of the county court in this proceeding, or at
any time thereafter, if and when it shall be shown to the
court that said insane person or mental incompetent has
real or personal estate, to appoint some fit person to be
conservator of the estate of the patient and if any patient
committed under this article has any estate in the hands
of his conservator, an account of his keeping shall be
rendered by the proper authorities of the asylum or hospital, or the owner or owners of any other place to which
he has been committed, or where he has been treated, to
the county court by which said commitment was ordered,
and upon further order of said court the conservator
shall pay said account out of any money in his hands belonging to said estate, and which may be lawfully applied;
provided, however, that when any county court shall appoint a conservator of any such estate, the court shall,
in writing, at once notify the superintendent or other
executive officer of the institution to which such patient
has been committed, of the fact of the appointment of
such conservator giving the name and address of such
conservator.
If said person so committed has no estate said account shall be presented to the board of county commissioners of said county, whose duty it shall be, on satisfactory proof of the justice of such account, to issue their
warrant to the treasurer of the county therefor.
Provided, however, that no such account for the
treatment in the state insane asylum shall be so presented
or audited.
5Id. at § 9.
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In the 1951 Session of the General Assembly it was further
provided :6
Section 1. Whenever any person is admitted, committed or transferred to any public institution of this state,
maintained for the care, support, maintenance, education and treatment of insane persons, mentally incompetent persons, criminally insane persons, feeble-minded
or epileptic persons, and such person or persons have real
or personal estate or both, the estate of such person or
persons, irrespective of its source, composition or origin,
shall be primarily liable for the payment of the claims
of the said public institution for the care, support, maintenance, education and treatment of said person equal to
the cost per capita per month of care and treatment of
other patients in said institution.
Section 2. Upon the failure, neglect or refusal of the
conservator, guardian, executor or administrator to pay
the claim of said public institution as hereinbefore provided upon the complaint of the superintendent or chief
administrative officer of said public institution and the
requirement of the Governor, the Attorney General shall
institute, maintain and prosecute an action in law for the
collection and payment of said claim or claims.
In addition to the foregoing conservator or guardian liability,
the legislature in 1945 7 imposed upon the kinfolk of the insane
inmate the liability for his or her support while in the Colorado
State Hospital. This matter has been passed upon by our Supreme
Court in the case of People, ex rel. Zimmerman, v. Herder.8 The
order and rank of liability of said kinfolk appears in the statutes
as Section 1 and 2 of Chapter 124.
In summation, the estate of the inmate is primarily liable for
his care and support at the Colorado State Hospital. If there is
no such estate, the inmate's kinfolk are next liable. If there is no
estate and no responsible kinfolk, the insane pauper is a ward of
the state and must be maintained at state expense, since there is
no county liability for inmates of the Colorado State Hospital.
THE COLORADO PSYCHOPATHIC HOSPITAL

The Psychopathic Hospital was established in 1919. 9 The
objects of this hospital were stated to be as follows :10
Said Hospital shall be primarily and principally conducted, not for chronic illness, but for the care and treatment of legal residents of Colorado who are afflicted with
a mental disease or disorder, or abnormal mental condition, which can probably be remedied by observation,
6CoLo. LAWS, c. 224 (1951).
COLO. LAWS, C. 170, p. 464 (1945).

8122 Colo. 456 (1950).
9COLO. LAWS, C. 169, p. 568 (1919); now COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 105, §§ 59-66
(1935).
,* COLO. LAws, C. 158, p. 525, (1923); now COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 105, § 69 (1935).
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treatment and hospital care. Said Hospital shall also be
utilized for such instruction and for such scientific research as, in the opinion of the Board of Regents, will
promote the welfare of the patients committed to its care,
and assist in the application of science to the prevention
and cure of mental diseases.
Persons eligible to admission to said Hospital as patients shall belong to one of the following classes: First,
Voluntary Public Patients; Second, Committed Public
Patients; Third, Voluntary Private Patients; Fourth,
Committed Private Patients; Fifth, Part Pay Patients,
either voluntary or committed.
Section 4 of this same act made it the duty of the "...
county
judge to cause thorough investigation to be made of the financial
condition of said person for whom treatment is sought, or of the
persons legally responsible for his support or maintenance." 11
The previously referred to statutory provision giving the
order and rank of kinfolk liability reads:12
Every poor person who shall be unable to earn a
livelihood in consequence of any bodily infirmity, idiocy,
lunacy or other unavoidable cause, shall be supported by
the father, grandfather, mother, grandmother, child or
grandchild, brother or sister of such poor person, if
they or either of them be of sufficient ability.
If the temporary patient has no estate and no relative financially able to support him, then his cost of care while undergoing
such temporary
treatment is to be met from the Psychopathic
18
Fund.
14
It also was provided in the 1923 act that :
Section 13. If it shall appear to said Judge that any
Public Patient, or Part Pay Patient ordered either admitted or committed to said Hospital, is unable financially,
of himself or of others, to provide himself with transportation to said Hospital, then said Judge may authorize the
actual and necessary expenses of said transportation,
which expense shall be paid by the county of residence
of said person, and it shall be the duty of the Board of
County Commissioners to provide for such payments.
* * * Said expenses and fees shall be paid by the county
of residence of said person and it shall be the duty of
the Board of County Commissioners of said county to
provide for such payments.
Other than this, there does not seem to be any county liability for the care, support and maintenance of such patient at said
Psychopathic Hospital. Emphasis should be placed, however, upon
the temporary character of admission to this hospital, as well as
"Compiled as COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 105, § 70 (1935).
2 COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 124, § 1 (1935).
COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 105,
"Now id. at § 79.

§ 69 (1935).

See also § 76.
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the fact that, before committing a patient to this hospital, "the
Judge shall ascertain from the Director of said Hospital when
said person may be received in said Hospital," and otherwise follow the procedure outlined in Section 6 of the 1923 Act. 15
THE STATE HOMES AND TRAINING SCHOOLS

The next group of mental incompetents to be considered is
that group admitted to the State Homes and Training Schools at
Ridge and Grand Junction.
Recently the Attorney General was asked whether these institutions are hospitals or educational institutions, not penal or
charitable in character. In his opinion, No. 2083-1951, he said:
The statutes which we shall hereafter consider are
those relating to the said State Homes at Ridge and Grand
Junction.
The institution at Ridge was created by Ch. 71, S. L.
1909 (Sec. 48, Ch. 105, 1935 C. S. A.), and Sec. 1 of the
Act provides that:
"There is hereby established the State Home and
Training School for Mental Defectives. The essential
object of said school and home shall be the mental, moral,
physical, education and training of feeble minded children and the treatment and care of persons so mentally
defective as to be incompetent to care for themselves or
their property."
By Sec. 1, Ch. 64, S. L. 1919 (Sec. 55, Ch. 105, '35
C. S. A.), the institution at Grand Junction was created
as follows:
"There is hereby established on the property of the
state at the former Indian school at Grand Junction, Colorado, an addition to the state home and trainingschool for
mental defectives." (Emphasis supplied.)
Sec. 2 of Ch. 71, S. L. 1909 (Sec. 50, Ch. 105, '35
C. S. A., institution at Ridge), provides that:
"Within 90 days after appointment, the commissioners shall, with the approval of the governor appoint a
superintendent, who shall be a skilled physician, who has
had not less than two (2) years' experience in a similar
institution, he shall be competent to direct the medical,
hygenic, educational and industrial interests of said state
home and training school; he shall reside at the state home
and training school, and shall have a general supervision
over its affairs; * * *
"Said board of commissioners, shall in like manner,
appoint a matron, who shall be an assistant to the superintendent, especially in the caring for females admitted
to said state home and training school; * *
"Now

id. at § 72.
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Sec. 2, subsec. (f), Ch. 153, S. L. 1949, provides that:
"Public Schools shall mean all state supported elementary and high schools, and junior colleges of the state.
In addition, supervisory power herein set forth shall extend to the educational programs of the Colorado Industrial School for Boys, Industrial School for Girls, School
for the Deaf and Blind, Home for Dependent and Neglected Children, State Home and Training School at Ridge,
and State Home and Training School at Grand Junction
in the matters of curriculum, teacher certification, and
educational, statistical and financial reporting."
Sec. 5 of said Ch. 153, S. L. 1949, vests in the State
Board of Education:
" * * * such powers and duties as are necessary for
carrying out the responsibility of general supervision of
the public schools of the state, * * *."
Sec. 1, H. B. No. 168, S. L. '51, provides that:
"The State Home and Training Schools for Mental
Defectives at Ridge, Colorado, and Grand Junction, Colorado, shall hereafter be known and designated as the State
Home and Training School at Ridge and the State Home
and Training School at Grand Junction."
It is apparent from these several acts that the successive legislatures have carefully considered and denominated both institutions as schools, and that the said institutions are educational institutions of the State of
Colorado. This is particularly true of Ch. 153, S. L. 1949,
wherein the State Department of Education is given the
power to supervise "matters of curriculum, teacher certification, and educational, statistical and financial reporting."
It is, therefore, my conclusion that the State Home
and Training School at Ridge is one of the educational
institutions of the state, and that the State Home and
Training School at Grand Junction is an addition to the
institution at Ridge, and is likewise one of the educational institutions of the state.
From a reading of Secs. 48 to 58 (1), Ch. 105, '35
C. S. A., as amended, it is impossible to spell out any reformatory character to these institutions. The every purpose of the schools is to aid, assist, protect and educate
those who are mentally defective and cannot otherwise
feed, dress or assist themselves. That they are not charitable in character appears from Secs. 9 and 52 of Ch. 105,
'35 C. S. A., and Ch. 224, S. L. 1951.
As pointed out in the beginning,16 Section 9 of the present
chapter on insane persons provides that these schools shall bill
on the county commissioners if the inmates have no estate of their
10Supra, p. 28.
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own. In addition to this expression of legislative intent upon the
matter of the county's liability for the care, custody, training and
education of its feeble-minded, we have only to turn to Chapter 77
of the 1901 Sessions Laws, 17 for confirmation of legislative intent.
Those sections provide as follows:
Sec. 28. Whenever a relative, guardian or friend of
a feeble-minded person shall make application to the
judge of any county court of the state for the relief, care,
custody, training and education of said feeble-minded
person, the judge of the county court of the county wherein such person resides, if he shall deem such feebleminded person a proper subject for care, custody, relief,
training and education, may issue an order authorizing
the board of county commissioners to provide for the
care, custody, relief, training and education of such feeble-minded person. The judge shall accompany said order
with a certificate stating the name in full, age, place of
nativity, the town, city or county in which said feebleminded person resides, and whether such feeble-minded
person, his parents, relatives or guardians are able to
provide for his support, in whole or in part, which statement must be verified by the affidavit of two disinterested persons, residents of the same county as the feebleminded person and acquainted with the facts and circumstances stated.
Sec. 29. The board of county commissioners, upon
receipt of said order from the county judge, shall provide for the care, custody, relief, training and education
of such feeble-minded person under the care of a public
or private institution provided for the treatment of feeble-minded persons in this or other state, and the board
of county commissioners shall appropriate from the fund
provided for the care and relief of the poor, not otherwise
appropriated, such sums as shall be necessary.
In summation, let me say that it seems to be the legislative
intent to make the estates of the inmates primarily liable for their
support, maintenance, etc., at the state schools at Ridge and Grand
Junction, with the county of commitment secondarily liable in
case there is no such estate.
PERSONALS
Charles S. Thomas is seeking an attorney who might be interested in taking over his established law practice, office, library
and home in Paonia, Delta County, Colorado. There is no other
practicing attorney in the near vicinity.
"Now CoLO. STAT.

ANN., C. 105,

§§ 28 and 29 (1935).
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CASE COMMENTS
CONFLICT OF LAWS -TO
WHAT EXTENT WILL OR
SHOULD THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE FORUM BE APPLIED IN A CAUSE OF ACTION ARISING IN ANOTHER
JURISDICTION ?-Basing his complaint on the Illinois wrongful
death statute, the plaintiff brought an action in the Wisconsin
state court to recover from the defendants for wrongful death resulting from injuries sustained in an automobile accident in Illinois. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the merits, holding that the Wisconsin wrongful death act which provides that
"such action be brought for a death caused in this case," establishes a local public policy against Wisconsin entertaining suits
brought under the wrongful death statutes of other states. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed. Held: Reversed, with four
Justices dissenting. The Wisconsin statutory policy which would
exclude the Illinois cause of action involved was forbidden by the
full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution. Hughes v.
Fetter, 71 S. Ct. 980 (1951).
From cases in which the public policy of the forum was declared predominate where in conflict with applicable foreign statutes without discussing the constitutional issue raised by the full
faith and credit clause,' the Supreme Court has, by a rather spasmodic process, gradually narrowed the power of the states to refuse, on grounds of public policy, to enforce rights arising under
statutes of a sister state. Prior to the decision in the instant case,
the rights given by a foreign statute were declared superior to local
policy where the forum's interest was "insufficient". 2 This seems
to stem from the idea that local policy becomes important only
when the transaction is domestic, 3 or where the interest of the
forum is superior when weighed with that of the foreign jurisdiction.4 While Hughes v. Fetter has not made particularly definite
the extent to which the forum must give recognition to the extraterritorial statutes conflicting with local policy, it does appear that
use has been made of a more comprehensive test than previously
employed; not only was there a "balancing of interests," but also,
a critical inquiry was made as to the value of the local policy. 5 The
result that will be reached when other local policies of exclusion
IE.g., Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U.S. 412, 62 L. ed. 368 (1918).
'Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 79 L. ed. 1100, 55 S. Ct. 589 (1935);
Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 56 L. ed. 749, 32 S. Ct. 415 (1912).
' Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express Co., 314 U.S. 201 (1941).
'Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Commission, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
8 Justice Cardozo seems to have indicated that such an inquiry should be
made when he said, "[the courts] are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign
right .. . unless help would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some
prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common
weal." Loucks v. Standard Oil of N. Y., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918).
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are tested is uncertain. Only a few types of statutes are entitled
to full faith and credit under existing decisions.6 In spite of the
general language used, it would be a mistake to assume that Hughes
v. Fetter has done any more than indicate that the Supreme Court
of a local policy excluding rights
will carefully consider the validity
7
arising under a foreign law.
MILTON LANKTON

JACK HULL.

DEEDS-GRANTEES TAKE AS TENANTS BY
THE ENTIRETIES.
Land was deeded to "Francis Lucas, a single man, and Joseph
Lucas and Matilda Lucas, his wife." Francis Lucas was the son
of the other two grantees. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held that the husband and wife took their moiety as tenants by
the entireties, and that the son had a one-half interest in the
property.1
The court used the following language:
... [A] conveyance to three parties two of whom are
husband and wife but neither designated as such, shall,
in the absence of any language in the conveyance disclosing a contrary intention, be deemed a conveyance of one
third shares.... But the intention is the cardinaland controlling element,2 and if intention that the husband and
wife shall take as such [i.e. by entireties] sufficiently appears, it will be given effect.
From the above mentioned words of conveyance, the court
found sufficient intention that a tenancy by the entireties be created, saying that the phrase "his wife" in the deed indicated that
the parties attached significance to the marital status.
The question arises, then, as to how the Colorado court would
interpret language in a deed similar to that involved in the Heatter
case; but there appear to be no Colorado cases passing on the
precise point.
In Whyman v. Johnston et al.2 the holding that, in the ab(a) Stockholder's liability suits: Order of United Commercial Travelers
of the World v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 67 S. Ct. 1355 (1947) ; Broderick v. Rosner,
Supra. (b) Charters and by-laws of beneficial fraternal organizations: Modern
Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925). (c) Employers liability
statutes: Tennessee Coal & R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914). (d) Workmen's compensation acts: Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943),
Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932). (e) Statutes governing insurance contracts: John Hancock Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299
U.S. 178 (1936); Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292
U.S. 143 (1934). (f) And, after Hughes v. Fetters, wrongful death statutes.
ICompare Broderick v. Rosner, Supra, and Clark v. Willard, 294 U.S. 211
(1935), cases decided in the same year and yet almost incapable of being reconciled if the language of Broderick v. Rosner be taken literally.
IHeatter v. Lucas et al., 367 Pa. 296, 80 A. 2d 749 (1951).
Italics by the court.
3 62 Colo. 461, 163 P. 76 (1917).
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sence of a showing in the conveyance of intention by the grantor,
no estate by the entireties is created when land is conveyed to
spouses. In that case, land was deeded to husband and wife by
their names only, with no indication of what type tenancy was
intended. Whether the parties were referred to as husband and
wife does not appear from the court's opinion. There would seem
to be no reason why the result would be different, insofar as it
relates to the question of tenancy by the entireties, if a third
grantee were involved.
Whether the Colorado court would hold that an estate by the
entireties was created where the intention to create such an estate is shown is a point on which there has been no decision,
although many attorneys feel that the question has been resolved
by the Whyman case. This belief on the part of lawyers is based
upon the dictum in the case to the effect that, after the passage
of the Married Women's Act, the reason for the common law rule
creating estates by the entireties ceased to exist, and upon the
head-note to the case which makes the statement that the Married
Women's Act abolished estates by the entireties. This interpretation of the case may, however, be too broad in view of the fact
that the deed there involved expressed no intention as to what
type of tenancy was meant to result.
Perhaps some indication that tenancies by the entireties still
exist is to be found in the Inheritance Tax Act of 1933,4 where
reference is made to property held in tenancy by the entireties; but
any such implication would appear to be nullified by the 1947
amendment 5 to the portion of the tax statute referred to, which
omitted the reference to the type estate in question.
The writers of this comment conclude that an estate by the
entireties definitely cannot be created in Colorado where no intention to create such appears; whether such estates continue to exist
and may be created by a showing of intention that such be created
remains, in Colorado, an open question.
JAMES NELSON

RALPH TAYLOR
ROBERT VAUGHN

PERSONALS
Richard H. Shaw and Clayton D. Knowles announce the removal of their offices from the Denver National Building to Suite
301 Equitable Building in Denver.
COLO. LAws, C. 106, p. 558 (1933).
'COLO. LAWS, C. 212, p. 537 (1947).
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DENVER BAR INSTITUTE
The 1952 Institute of the Denver Bar Association will study
laws affecting chattel financing. The first session will be held on
Wednesday, January 30th, in the auditorium of Van Schaack & Co.
and will feature discussions of the Colorado Chattel Mortgage Act
by Louis Hellerstein and the Colorado Motor Vehicle Title Act by
Harry A. King. At the second session on February 6th, Louis Hellerstein will study methods of inventory financing. On Wednesday,
February 13th, J. Glenn Donaldson will discuss installment sales
in Colorado and Frederick Storke of Boulder will review the
Accounts Receivable Act. All sessions will begin at 4:30 P.M. and
conclude at 6:00 P.M.
It is anticipated that a like program will be presented in other
parts of the state during the Spring months under the auspices
of the Colorado Bar Association and other local bar associations
as arrangements are completed.

SUPREME COURT AMENDS RULE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF COLORADO

Rule 117. Within fifteen days after an action becomes at issue
here, either party may, by separate document, with copy served
on opposing party, request oral argument, and the same will be
permitted only by order of this court fixing the date thereof, of
which counsel shall be notified by the clerk. The court may, of
its own motion, order oral argument at any time. Oral arguments
will be limited to thirty minutes to a side unless the court, by order,
extends the time thereof. The reading of written or printed arguments or lengthy citations will not be permitted.
Adopted December 13, 1951.
Effective January 1, 1952.
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